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Correspondence
UNIFORM ACCOUNTING FOR INDUSTRY
Sir: One must be bold to venture to add to the masterly treatment of the 
problem of uniform accounting for industry presented so eloquently by Mr. 
Couchman in the address published in the November, 1934, issue of The 
Journal of Accountancy. This problem of the accountancy profession 
finds its prototype in that of the legal profession in its attempted restatement 
of the law. An analogy between the two may prove of interest to your readers.
The American Law Institute was organized in February, 1923, and set before 
itself the task of preparing a restatement of the principles of the common law. 
Significant is it to note that the movement originated with and is being executed 
by the legal profession itself. It has not come as a mandate from government. 
It is no attempt to compile an official code to be imposed upon the public and 
the profession. Voluntarily, the nation's ablest legal minds have been dedi­
cated to these labors.
What progress has this great enterprise achieved? The principles of the 
common law have been in process of formulation for centuries. The average 
lay mind would imagine that those principles have become thoroughly crystal­
lized and fully developed and that a restatement of them would be a task 
simply and expeditiously accomplished. Yet today, after more than eleven 
years of unremitting labor, only two subjects (contracts and agency) and a 
portion of a third (torts) have been published; many others, however, are well 
in progress.
The difficulties encountered have been manifold. Addressing the American 
Law Institute at its third annual meeting, May 1, 1925, Justice Cardozo (now 
of the United States supreme court, then chief judge of the court of appeals 
of New York and actively identified with the work of the restatement) said:
“The existence of this institute is a declaration to the world that ‘laissez 
faire’ in law is going or has gone the way of ‘laissez faire’ in economics. . . .
“One finds it hard to exaggerate the difficulties that have been met and over­
borne. ... At the beginning there has been need to gather from the pro­
nouncements of the courts the principle or the rule implicit in their judgments. 
. . . This in itself is a wearisome and poignant task. ... You choose after 
long debate the principle or the rule that you are ready to espouse, and you 
think you understand it. There lies before you still the task of expressing it in 
words. At once new vistas of uncertainty are opened to your gaze.”
The judge then proceeded to elaborate on the many difficulties of the task, 
presenting specific illustrations. To select one, speaking on the subject of 
torts, he said:
“When I heard that the subjects to be covered at the beginning were battery, 
assault and false imprisonment, I thought there would be easy travel. I ask 
you to take my word for it—we have met with hard roads, and worse passes 
are ahead. A blow in the face seems a fairly palpable fact, but all sorts of 
mental reservations and concomitants have to be known and estimated before 
you can determine whether it is to be reckoned as an actionable wrong.”
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Finally, when a particular subject of the restatement is completed, what 
authority does it have? And, more especially, what finality does it have? In 
publishing each volume, the institute makes clear that the restatement has 
only the authority of the institute; that it represents the best legal thought as 
to what is the present state of the law on the subject; that it provides merely a 
new starting-point for future development. As to finality, Justice Cardozo 
phrases it thus:
“I am speaking of the magisterial pronouncements of the restatements 
themselves. In these, let us give definiteness and fixity of outline where there 
is definiteness and fixity in the law as it exists or where argument so preponder­
ates that a choice is fairly safe. Let us not hesitate, however, in other situa­
tions to say in all frankness that the problem is yet unsolved, and while indicat­
ing competing considerations either way, leave the answer to the years.”
“. . . definiteness and assurance and finality must be left to the agency of 
time . . . that in determining the tendencies and directions of legal develop­
ment in the future, something will have to be left, even when the restatement is 
completed, to those tentative gropings, those cautious experiments, those pro­
visional hypotheses, that are part of the judicial process.”
Thus, when this great restatement of the principles of the law is ultimately 
completed, it will be only a beginning. Change will set in before the ink is 
dry. It will constitute a consolidation and condensation of the learning of 
yesterday, preparing the legal profession for the developments of tomorrow.
Mr. Couchman’s discussion of the principles of accountancy singularly 
parallels Justice Cardozo’s analysis of the legal principles. Accounting prin­
ciples are grouped by Mr. Couchman in three classes: those that are now gen­
erally accepted, those that are at present debatable, and those as yet hidden, 
unknown or unstated. “Any strait-jacket applied to this growing art would 
stunt future development and improvement.” “May it not be similarly 
true that a rigid system devised and enforced today would be equally unsuited 
for the industry of tomorrow? ” Cardozo, in another treatise, has said the like 
of law. Common to the two professions, law and accountancy, has been the 
struggle between stability and progress, between flexibility and certainty.
But the proponents of uniform accounting for industry propose to go much 
farther in accountancy than the restatement has in law. As Mr. Couchman 
points out (page 336), there are four factors concerned: principles, procedure, 
accounts and presentation. The restatement of the law is limited to the prin­
ciples of the common law. Points of procedure and presentation are not at all 
attempted. And if the difficulties are so great in arriving at a common agree­
ment as to principles, how infinite would be the obstacles to uniformity of 
procedure and of presentation?
Unhappily, recognition of the analogy between the legal and accountancy 
professions is not as general as it should be. Too many still believe (and this 
number includes many judges, lawyers, legislators and administrative officers) 
that accountancy is an exact science—that an accounting principle is compara­
ble to a mathematical formula. Too few recognize the truth that Mr. Couch­
man stresses, that the practice of accountancy involves the exercise of experi­
enced judgment and skilled opinion, and that that is its major characteristic, 
not a purely incidental one.
The obstacles to uniform accounting for industry (embracing principles, 
procedure, and presentation) are more insuperable than those encountered by
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the American Law Institute in its restatement of the law. To seek to attain 
uniformity of accounting by mandate of government (either legislative or 
administrative) would be a fatal blunder, disastrous alike both to the public 
and to the profession. As Mr. Couchman suggests, and as is pointed out by 
the precedent of the legal profession, the solution rests rather with gradual 
evolution within the accountancy profession itself.
Yours truly,
Louis S. Goldberg
Sioux City, Iowa, November 10, 1934.
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